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“BAD BARRELS”: AN ORGANIZATIONAL-BASED ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
ABUSES AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON* 
IFEOMA AJUNWA** 
 
November of the year 2013 marked ten years since the ignoble practices at the American 
military prison in Abu Ghraib came to light. The significance of this date garnered little mention. 
And yet, in the decade since reports of human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib horrified the world, 
there has been no organizational reform of the American carceral complex .This Article provides 
an organizational analysis of the human rights abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib and offers 
suggestions to prevent future abuses within the American carceral system as a whole. 
Specifically, this Article employs the case study of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib as a heuristic 
device to demonstrate how criminal misconduct in the form of human rights abuses is tied to 
organizational design—meaning the organizational standards, structure, and other factors under 
which an organization operates—and how organizational theory should inform the enactment of 
future prison policy and laws to curb the occurrence of prisoner abuse. 
This Article focuses on the case of Abu Ghraib for two reasons. First, the incidents at 
Abu Ghraib offer a strongly shared knowledge base about prisoner abuses given the widespread 
attention they received in the media. Second, the established similarities between behavior of 
prison guards in American military prisons and correctional officers in American civilian prisons 
provide fertile ground for applying organizational lessons gleaned from Abu Ghraib to the larger 
U.S. carceral system. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 2004, American1 society and the larger international community were outraged as 
news outlets publicized photographs detailing what appeared to be the physical and sexual abuse 
of Iraqi prisoners at the American military prison in Abu Ghraib (known also as the Baghdad 
Correctional Facility).2 The photographs show American soldiers conducting themselves in ways 
that violated international law by taking pictures of or posing with Iraqi prisoners who were 
                                                                
* Many thanks to Diane Vaughan, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Sharon Dolovich, Stephen Lee, John Quigley, Jonathan 
Entin, and Jessie Hill for their helpful comments. 
** Assistant Professor of Law, David A. Clarke School of Law (University of the District of Columbia)   
1  I use the term “American” here, and in the remainder of the Article, in the widespread, albeit technically 
incorrect, manner to denote “relating to or of the” country, “United States of America.” Throughout the Article, I also use 
“the U.S.” or the “United States” interchangeably with “America” to refer to the same country. 
2  See, e.g., Tony Karon, How the Prison Scandal Sabotages the U.S. in Iraq, TIME WORLD (May 4, 2004), 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,632967,00.html (“There's no question U.S. officials are deeply aware of 
the damage done by the Abu Ghraib torture photographs. From President Bush on down, they've expressed outrage and 
revulsion at the images of U.S. soldiers abusing Iraqi detainees in one of Saddam Hussein's old torture chambers. . . . 
[T]he fallout from the revelations has been devastating, not only in the Arab and Muslim world, but globally, even among 
some allies in the Coalition.”). 
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arranged in sexually demeaning or painful positions.3 One infamous photograph shows an Iraqi 
prisoner with a hood over his head standing on a crate with what appears to be electric wires 
attached to him.4 
The soldiers whose images appear in the Abu Ghraib photographs were represented in 
the media as having acted unilaterally and without approval from military officers.5 The 
American military confirmed the vilification of these individual soldiers by subsequently meting 
out court-martial and prison sentences and administratively reprimanding officer Brigadier 
General Karpinski.6 Such censure reassured the public that the actions captured in the 
photographs were aberrations and not actions endemic to the military as an organization. The final 
message was that the soldiers were a few “bad apples” and had been successfully excised—not 
that blame could also be found within the “bad barrel,” the prison as an organization, and the 
manner in which the prison was organized and operated. 
Abu Ghraib, however, is just one incident in a larger pattern of human rights abuses 
present in American prisons, both military and non-military, domestic and international. Much 
evidence indicates that human rights abuses on par with the incidents at Abu Ghraib also occur in 
American civilian prisons.7 For example, in 2011 the ACLU released a report exposing a startling 
pattern of physical and sexual abuses in Los Angeles County jails and prisons, the largest carceral 
system in the world.8 One incident in the ACLU report involves the beating of an inmate who was 
                                                                
3  See Introduction: The Abu Ghraib Files, SALON.COM (Mar. 14, 2006), http://www.salon.com/2006/03/14/ 
introduction_2/ (presenting an annotated and chronological version of 279 photos and nineteen videos from the Abu 
Ghraib facility).  
4  Id.; see also Michael Scherer & Mark Benjamin, Electrical Wires, SALON.COM (Mar. 14, 2006), 
http://www.salon.com/2006/03/14/chapter_4/.  
5  See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib: American Soldiers Brutalized Iraqis. How Far Up 
Does the Responsibility Go?, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42 (“As the international furor grew, senior military 
officers, and President Bush, insisted that the actions of a few did not reflect the conduct of the military as a whole.”). But 
see Stone Phillips, Behind the Abu Ghraib Photos, DATELINE NBC (television broadcast Oct. 2, 2005), available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9532670/ (interview with U.S. Private Lynndie England, who was in Abu Ghraib 
photographs and claimed that she and the other convicted soldiers were mere “scapegoats for abuse encouraged by higher 
ups” and that their actions were “just humiliation tactics and things that [the soldiers] were told to do”). 
6  Josh White, Top Army Officers Are Cleared in Abuse Cases; One General Will Likely Get Reprimand 
Over Abu Ghraib, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2005, at A1. General Karpinski was the only top level officer who received an 
administrative reprimand for dereliction of duty. Id. “Top-level investigations into the abuses have largely stopped short of 
calling them systemic, but some found major problems with the way detention operations in Iraq were conducted after 
President Bush declared major combat in Iraq over in April 2003.” Id. Further, “[a] lack of planning and resources, the 
reports generally agreed, led to the U.S. detention system getting overwhelmed and fostered frustration with a lack of 
actionable intelligence with which to fight the insurgency.” Id. 
 The Army’s inspector general did conduct investigation as to the cause of the abuses, and “[s]ome of the probes 
identified senior leadership as being indirectly responsible for the climate that led to abuses but made no findings on 
culpability. . . . A comprehensive report about Abu Ghraib by Maj. Gen. George R. Fay concluded that there were failures 
at the highest levels, mainly in oversight lapses. He found that [Lt. Gen. Ricardo S.] Sanchez and his deputy ‘failed to 
ensure proper staff oversight of detention and interrogation operations’ and ‘reacted inadequately’ to warnings that abuse 
was occurring.” Id. 
7  See Jake Trapper & Marie Nelson, Texas Prison Abuse Case Linked to Abu Ghraib, ABC NEWS (Aug. 26, 
2004), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=128973&page=1&singlePage=true. 
8  See generally SARAH LIEBOWITZ ET AL., ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT & ACLU OF SO. CAL., CRUEL 
AND USUAL PUNISHMENT: HOW A SAVAGE GANG OF DEPUTIES CONTROLS LA COUNTY JAILS (2011). After examining the 
conditions in LA County jails through civilian complaints, jail tours, interviews with inmates, and expert analyses, the 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol17/iss2/1
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stripped naked and forced to parade down the halls of a cellblock while the prison guards taunted 
him with a homosexual slur.9 After the inmate returned to his cell, he was beaten and sexually 
assaulted by other inmates while the guards ignored his pleas for help.10 Another example from 
the ACLU report concerns a brutal attack on a prisoner who was beaten until he became 
motionless on the floor and was surrounded by a large pool of blood; the five guards responsible 
stopped only because they noticed a chaplain was observing them through a glass door to the 
room.11 In addition to the ACLU’s report, information released by the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
in 2012 reveals that one in ten adult prisoners have been victimized by staff or other prisoners12 
and that 86% of prisoners who reported sexual abuse by staff members had been victimized 
multiple times.13  Similar reports of witnessed abuse have also been presented by guards and 
prisoners at other American international prisons, such as the one at Guantanamo Bay, with 
prisoners being left hog-tied for hours, force-fed, and beaten bloody and unconscious for a verbal 
infraction.14 
Although the abuses in the military prison at Abu Ghraib, the international prison in 
Guantanamo Bay, and in the U.S. civilian prisons documented by the ACLU and Bureau of 
Justice Statistics took place under different contexts and circumstances, many important parallels 
exist between these three segments of the American carceral system. First, an overlap is often 
present between those who are employed in the military prison system and those who are 
employed in the U.S. civilian carceral system.15 Indeed, Alan Elsner—author of Gates of 
Injustice: The Crisis in America’s Prisons, which details the human rights situation in the U.S. 
penal system—indicated that “he ‘was not that surprised’ when he first heard allegations that U.S. 
soldiers had abused Iraqi detainees, ‘especially when it became clear that two of the correctional 
officers who were involved in Abu Ghraib actually had been prison guards in the United 
States.’”16 Other key players in the American military prison system in Iraq were also formerly 
involved in the U.S. penal system. For instance, in 2003 the Bush administration selected six 
former state prison commissioners to help set up prisons throughout Iraq; of those six individuals, 
four “had left their previous posts after allegations of neglect, brutality, and prisoner deaths” had 
surfaced.17 
                                                                
report makes clear that the beatings and other abuses are not overreactions in response to prisoner provocation. Id. at 1. 
Rather, in many cases, these are acts of arbitrary brutality. Id. at 8. One expert opinion reveals that at the jail there is 
“inattentive and inadequate supervision, a virtually autonomous staff of deputies managing the inmate population by their 
own arbitrary and often violent whims . . . .” Id. at 8. 
9  Id. at 13. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. at 10–11. 
12  ALLEN J. BECK & CANDACE JOHNSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL 
VICTIMIZATION REPORTED BY FORMER STATE PRISONERS, 2008 8 (2012). 
13  Id. at 14.  
14  See, e.g., Jennifer Fenton, Ex-Guantanamo Guard Tells of Violence Against Detainees, CNN.com 
(October 28, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/28/world/meast/guantanamo-guard/. 
15  See Trapper & Nelson, supra note 7.  
16  Id. The two officers whom Elsner references are Staff Sergeant Ivan “Chip” Frederick who “worked at 
the Buckingham Correctional Center in Dillwyn, Va., for more than five years before going to Iraq” and Specialist Charles 
Garner who had begun “work[ing] at the State Correctional Institute at Greene, Pa., in 1996.” Id. 
17  Id. (“One of the four, Terry Stewart, was sued by the Justice Department in 1997, when he ran Arizona's 
Corrections Department. The lawsuit charged that at least 14 female inmates were repeatedly raped, sexually assaulted and 
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Second, and perhaps most importantly, significant parallels exist between the 
organizational structures of the U.S. military prison system and the U.S. civilian prison system. 
For example, both systems are “total institutions,” as defined by sociologist Erving Goffman.18 
Both operate under a licit cloak of secrecy that shields them from the public eye,19 and both 
evince rigid hierarchical structures.20 Given these similarities between American civilian prisons 
and American military prisons, organizational lessons gleaned from Abu Ghraib may also be 
applied to the larger U.S. carceral system. 
This Article is the first to provide a detailed explanation of how human rights abuses that 
society tends to link only to individual behavior are also tied to organizational factors. Generally, 
U.S. criminal law focuses on the actus reus21 and the mens rea22 of the individual—that is, did the 
individual commit the act and did the individual have the intent to commit the act? Discussions in 
the aftermath of Abu Ghraib illustrates this very type of analysis of prison abuse cases as both 
media and judicial attention portrayed the soldiers as individual actors. For instance, interviews 
and magazine reports delved into the individual soldiers’ familial backgrounds, educational 
histories, personalities, and other socio-psychological characteristics.23 The sole focus on 
individual culpability is also in keeping with past academic analysis of prison and military 
abuses.24 
This Article, however, moves away from criminal law’s singular emphasis on individual 
culpability in the case of prison abuse. Rather, this Article adopts a more holistic investigation of 
                                                                
watched by corrections workers as they dressed, showered and used the bathroom. . . . Another former state prison 
commissioner was ‘Lane’ McCotter, who resigned as head of the Utah Department of Corrections after a mentally ill 
inmate died after spending 16 hours strapped to a restraining chair.”); see also, Brian Ross, Iraq Prison Chiefs Had 
Troubling Pasts, ABC NEWS, (May 20, 2004), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=131657&page= 
1&singlePage=true (“The widening scandal over the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. soldiers has raised eyebrows about 
whether the influence of the former prison commissioners might be partly to blame.”). 
18  See ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND 
OTHER INMATES xiii (1961); see also infra Part II.A. 
19  See generally State: Prison Secrecy, THE PRESS ENTERPRISE, (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.pe.com/ 
opinion/editorials-headlines/20120123-state-prison-secrecy.ece (editorializing on the need to give reporters greater access 
to the California prison system to expose conditions and abuses). 
20  See PHILLIP GOUREVITCH & ERROL MORRIS, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 131 (2008). The 
military chain of command creates the hierarchy followed in a military prison; in a domestic prison, an administrative 
hierarchy is present, with the wardens at the top and correctional officers at the bottom. 
21  See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.01–11 (6th ed. 2012) (discussing 
the formal elements of actus rea); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4 (2000) (advocating for 
alternative understandings of culpability). 
22  See generally DRESSLER, supra note 21, at § 10.01–07 (discussing the formal elements of mens rea); 
FLETCHER, supra note 21, at § 6.5 (examining the “[c]oncept of [i]ntention” in criminal offenses). 
23  See, e.g., Philip Gourevitch & Errol Morris, Annals of War: Exposure – The Woman Behind the Camera 
at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, March 24, 2008, at 13 (examining the life and experiences of Specialist Sabrina 
Harman in the wake of the Abu Ghraib abuses becoming public). 
24  See generally, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 
MIL. L. REV. 99 (1972) (focusing on the conduct of specific U.S. military leaders and refuting arguments that their conduct 
in Vietnam violated American law); Jeffrey F. Addicott & William A. Hudson, Jr., The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of My 
Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons 139 MIL. L. REV. 153, 153 (1993) (describing the acts of individual officers and task 
forces in Vietnam and arguing that the “nightmarish event[s]” of the My Lai Massacre offer lessons for preventing similar 
human rights violations in the future).  
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the causation of prison abuse that illuminates how organizational structure and the role of various 
organizational factors—such as the destabilizing effects of isolated prisons and shifting 
organizational standards—might allow and facilitate individual perpetrators’ criminal actions. In 
so doing, this Article poses questions different than those centered on mens rea and actus reus, 
asking instead: What organizational factors enabled the charged individual to commit her 
wrongful act? How did organizational factors encourage the charged individual to form the intent 
to commit the wrongful act? 
Although this Article examines the impact of organizational structure on individual 
conduct, its primary purpose is not to introduce organizational structure as a mitigating factor for 
individual culpability. Rather, the goal is to argue for a broader view of the role of law. This 
Article ultimately contends that the law, rather than merely acting ex post facto to assign 
culpability or liability after the fact, must also act ex ante by enacting regulations that address the 
very root causes of criminal misconduct before they occur. 
The Article proceeds as follows in making its arguments. Part I of this Article provides 
background information regarding the abuses and misconduct at Abu Ghraib and within domestic 
American prisons. Part II of the Article describes the sociological and organizational theories that 
provide the foundation for its analysis. Part III then uses Abu Ghraib as a case study to 
demonstrate how organizational factors may contribute to the commission of human rights abuses 
in prisons. Finally, in Part IV this Article concludes by discussing legal preventative steps that can 
be taken to eliminate the types of abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib and that may regularly 
occur in civilian prisons. 
II. “BAD BARREL”: THEORIES FOR THE ORGANIZATION AS INCUBATOR OF  
DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 
The extant characteristics of an organization can function as “opportunity structures” for 
misconduct.25 That is, organizational structure—the hierarchy, division of labor, geographic 
dispersion, specialized units, and other factors of an organization—may create locations where 
misconduct can occur.26 “Structural secrecy,” an organizational effect resulting from 
specialization, may also provide opportunities for individuals to violate rules and norms on an 
organization’s behalf.27 
Past research on prison abuses and military atrocities that shock the public has focused 
on either assigning and/or mitigating individual blame for such atrocities or on the dangers of and 
ethical problems related to torture itself. For example, in their research of the My Lai massacre of 
Vietnamese civilians by American soldiers who claimed to be following military orders, social 
scientists Lee Hamilton and Herbert Kelman followed a social-psychological approach that 
centers on the individual soldiers and their blame for the massacre, without attempting to analyze 
the underlying organization to which all the individuals belonged.28 Similarly, while a multiplicity 
of law review articles address the abuses at Abu Ghraib, most of the analyses do not look at the 
                                                                
25  See Diane Vaughan, Theorizing the Dark Side of Organizations 14–16 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law School Journal of Law and Social Change) [hereinafter Vaughan, 
Theorizing]. 
26  See id. at 17. 
27  Id. 
28  See generally V. LEE HAMILTON & HERBERT C. KELMAN, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY (1989). 
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impact of the organizations involved or their organizational structures. Instead, they focus on 
narrowly constructed legal issues, such as the balance between executive power and judicial 
review during times of war;29 the tension between domestic and international law;30 the legal and 
ethical quandary surrounding the use of torture to combat terrorism;31 and the professional 
responsibility of the lawyers involved in the drafting of the so-called “torture memos.”32 
Only a few scholarly works have looked beyond the notion of torture itself and the 
individual culpability for prison abuse to examine the organizations in which these abuses have 
occurred. Stanford University psychology professor Philip Zimbardo, for instance, conducted the 
highly publicized “Stanford Prison Experiment,” the first academic study to focus on the social-
psychological effects of imprisonment on both the prisoners and the guards.33 Within a mere six 
days of imposed prison-like conditions, Zimbardo documented brutal and sadistic behavior on the 
                                                                
29  See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2005) (analyzing the executive 
directives that relied upon the Commander-in-Chief Clauses of the Constitution and that gave rise to lawless zones of 
detention such as Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo). Amann argues that, although a splintered Supreme Court decision 
claimed judicial review of executive actions did exist, much of the damage to human rights had been done and the lawless 
spaces were already in place. Id. at 2097, 2139–40.  
30   See, e.g., Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations For the Use of Force, International Law, and the 
Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293 (2005) (analyzing whether domestic or international law governs 
Congressional authorization for the use of force, as well as the President’s war powers and whether there is a need to 
accurately map out this legal structure for the United States). Wuerth reviews international law that has figured 
prominently in several on-going disputes around actions of the U.S. military in Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo, and here 
in the United States. Id. 
31  See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, The Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269 (2005) (discussing a variety 
of reasons, including ineffectiveness, that the U.S. should not engage in torture and arguing that collective condemnation 
of torture, rather than moral vacillation, will diminish the likelihood of future instances of abuse). Strauss offers: “Abu 
Ghraib was not caused by a handful of sadistic, overworked, untrained soldiers. It was the inevitable result of an 
Administration that, in pursuit of the admirable goal of national security, lost sight of the need to maintain the soul of the 
nation.” Id. at 1310. 
 See also Jennifer Van Bergen & Douglas Valentine, The Dangerous World of Indefinite Detentions: Vietnam to 
Abu Ghraib, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 449 (2005) (analyzing why administrative detention may result in, or even 
encourage, torture). Bergen and Valentine argue: “[W]here you find administrative detentions, you are likely to find 
torture. . . . Th[e] reason is simple and can be traced to the elements of administrative detention itself: the absence of 
human rights safeguards and normal legal guarantees such as due process, habeas corpus, fair trial, confidential legal 
counsel, and judicial review; vague and confusing definitions, standards, and procedures; inadequate adversarial 
procedural oversight; excessive Executive Branch power stemming from prolonged emergencies; and the involvement of 
the Central Intelligence Agency (‘CIA’) or other secret, thus unaccountable, Executive Branch agencies.” Id. at 449–50. 
32  See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 689 (2004) (exploring the ethical concerns and responsibilities of the lawyers that drafted the torture 
memoranda). Bilder and Vagts argue: “First, the[] memoranda cannot in themselves insulate or immunize persons 
engaging or complicit in torture or war crimes from international or domestic criminal responsibility for their conduct. . . . 
Second, an attorney who gives advice intended to assist or provide a ‘road map’ for the client in violating or 
circumventing the law may be held complicit in the client’s criminal conduct. . . . Third, even if the[] memoranda 
somehow have the effect of protecting persons involved in torture or war crimes from prosecution under U.S. law, they 
may not provide protection from prosecution or liability in international tribunals or the courts of other countries. . . . 
Finally, it is questionable whether the policy that the memoranda sought to justify—avoiding U.S. obligations under 
international humanitarian treaties—has in fact furthered U.S. objectives in the ‘war on terror.’” Id. at 694–95. 
33  See generally Phillip Zimbardo, Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulation Study of the Psychology of 
Imprisonment Conducted at Stanford University, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, http://www.prisonexp.org (last visited February 
20, 2013). 
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part of the guards.34 Zimbardo also testified on behalf of an Abu Ghraib guard, Sergeant Ivan 
“Chip” Frederick, during his court-martial, arguing that Frederick should receive a lesser sentence 
due to the mitigating circumstances of the situational pressures of a prison.35 
Zimbardo later went on to write The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People 
Turn Evil, a book in which he discusses the connections between Abu Ghraib and the prison 
experiments.36 Zimbardo also distinguishes between individual evil and “administrative evil,” 
recognizing differences between individual moral defect and institutional or organizational 
influence.37 However, Zimbardo’s analysis is limited to socio-psychological issues; he does not 
examine which organizational factors facilitated and encouraged misconduct and he does not 
detail how a better organizational design might prevent future abuse. 
Criminologist Michelle Brown is one of few scholars to have offered an organizational 
perspective to the misconduct at Abu Ghraib. In her article “Setting the Conditions” for Abu 
Ghraib: The Prison Nation Abroad, Brown argues that the American prison system, with its goals 
of retribution and isolation rather than rehabilitation, has evolved to permit harsher disciplinary 
and information-gathering tactics, especially in light of the events of 9/11.38 In addition to 
highlighting the selection of “bad apples” that were charged with full responsibility for the crimes 
at Abu Ghraib,39 Brown also draws parallels between the harshness of “supermax” domestic 
prisons and the conditions at Abu Ghraib.40 Building on Brown’s established parallel between 
abuses at American domestic prisons and abuses at Abu Ghraib, this Article provides a full and 
systematic organizational analysis of Abu Ghraib that serves to address troubling trends within 
the American carceral system as a whole. The analysis offered is particularly important because 
Abu Ghraib was not an aberration.41 
This Article employs organizational theory from sociologists such as Erving Goffman 
and Diane Vaughan to enhance understandings of how, why, and under what circumstances 
abuses like those at Abu Ghraib are likely to occur and flourish. Although prior literature analyzes 
the prison as an organization,42 such literature is not particularly relevant or useful in addressing 
                                                                
34  Id. 
35  PHILLIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL 372–73 
(2007).  
36  See id.at 329–37. 
37  Id. at 381 (“[A]dministrative evil . . . constitutes the foundation of complicity of the chain of political and 
military command in [the Abu Ghraib] abuses and tortures.”). 
38  See Michelle Brown, “Setting the Conditions” for Abu Ghraib: The Prison Nation Abroad, 57 AM. 
QUARTERLY 973, 978–82 (2005). 
39  Id. at 976–77. 
40  Id. at 986–87. 
41  The conditions underlying the incidents at Abu Ghraib are not dissimilar to the conditions that led to the 
Attica Prison Uprising in New York State in 1971. See generally, e.g., N.Y. STATE SPECIAL COMM’N ON ATTICA, ATTICA: 
THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA (1972) (describing the conditions that 
resulted in the uprising and the events that occurred); A Year Ago at Attica, TIME, Sept. 25, 1972, at 42 (reporting on the 
events of violence and the aftermath of the uprising); War at Attica: Was There No Other Way?, TIME, September 27, 
1971, at 18 (explaining the factors that contributed to the uprising). 
42  See generally, e.g., LAWRENCE E. HAZELRIGG, PRISON WITHIN SOCIETY: A READER IN PENOLOGY (1968) 
(examining the conflicting organizational goals of a prison); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: 
SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (rev. ed. 1990) (tracing the historical development of different 
organizational models for places of confinement). 
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the type of heinous organizational misconduct that occurred at Abu Ghraib as most are concerned 
with the sociological effects of imprisonment on the inmate. Rather, the most relevant analyses 
here are the organizational theories of sociologist Erving Goffman—which address the 
destabilizing effects of a mental institution on both inmates and staff alike43—and those of 
sociologist and organizational theorist Diane Vaughan—which analyze how organizational 
structure itself and the environment in which the organization operates might provide 
opportunities and incentives for misconduct.44 
A. “Stir Crazy”: Erving Goffman’s Theories on the Effects of a Total Institution 
Erving Goffman’s ethnographic research on asylums offers critical insights into how 
institutions and structures such as places of incarceration may facilitate and encourage human 
rights abuses.45 Defining a total institution as “a place of residence and work where a large 
number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of 
time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life,” Goffman explains that 
“[p]risons serve as a clear example” of a total institution.46 
Goffman’s descriptions of a total institution perfectly match prison conditions. For 
example, Goffman highlights that “[t]he central feature of total institutions . . . [is] a breakdown 
of the barriers ordinarily separating the[] three spheres of life [sleep, play, and work].”47 In both 
military and civilian prisons, prisoners, and in some cases the guards, all sleep, play, and work 
within the walls of the institution.48 Additionally, Goffman contends, “all aspects of life are 
conducted in the same place and under the same single authority” in total institutions.49 In many 
ways, the entrapment of criminal perpetrators in the same space under one authority is the very 
essence of prisons. Finally, Goffman notes, “daily activity is carried on in the immediate company 
of a large batch of others, . . . the day’s activities are tightly scheduled, . . . [and] the various 
enforced activities are brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill 
the official aims of the institution.”50 
Through his analysis, Goffman finds that isolation can exacerbate the total institution’s 
                                                                
43  See generally GOFFMAN, supra note 18. 
44  See generally DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, 
AND DEVIANCE AT NASA (1996) (arguing the organizational features of NASA acted as contributing causes to the 
explosion of the Challenger shuttle) [hereinafter VAUGHAN, CHALLENGER]; DIANE VAUGHAN, CONTROLLING UNLAWFUL 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE MISCONDUCT (1983) (presenting a case study of a 
1977 fraudulent double-billing scheme at Revco Drug Stores, Inc. to examine and illustrate hypotheses about societal 
influences on organizational behavior, including enabling or facilitating unwanted activities); Diane Vaughan, History as 
Cause: Columbia and Challenger, in COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD REPORT VOLUME I, NASA 195-204 
(2003) (“This chapter shows how previous political, budgetary, and policy decisions by leaders at the White House, 
Congress, and NASA . . . impacted the Space Shuttle Program’s structure, culture, and safety system . . . , and how these 
in turn resulted in flawed decision-making . . . .”) [hereinafter Vaughan, History]; Vaughan, Theorizing, supra note 25 
(explaining a “theory of organizational deviance” and the method of analogical theorizing that produced it). 
45  See GOFFMAN, supra note 18, at 6-35, 43-48, 74-92. 
46  Id. at xiii. 
47  Id. at 5–6. 
48  See id. at 6. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. 
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destabilizing effect on the individual.51 Usually, even in total institutions, there is “a basic split 
between a large managed group” (the inmates) and “a small supervisory staff.”52 While inmates 
“typically live in the institution and have restricted contact with the world outside the walls[,] 
staff often operate on an eight-hour day and are socially integrated into the outside world.”53 
Where, however, the staff or employees of an institution are required to reside within the 
institution, the staff can feel that “they are suffering special hardships” and experience “a status 
dependency on life on the inside which they did not expect.”54 As a result, the identity and 
behavioral motivations of the staff become inextricably linked to their assigned role in the 
organization. 
The structure of Abu Ghraib is a good example of the above-described organizational 
set-up and one which creates an environment ripe for abuse. One searing illustration of the effects 
of such a structure is former Private Lynndie England’s lack of remorse for her part in the Abu 
Ghraib abuses more than eight years later. When interviewed in March 2012, England still 
believed that the abused Abu Ghraib prisoners got what they deserved and she refused to 
apologize to them. She said: “Their lives are better. They got the better end of the deal . . . . They 
weren’t innocent. They’re trying to kill us, and you want me to apologize to them? It’s like saying 
sorry to the enemy.”55 England’s comments indicate continued over-identification with her 
occupational role as prison guard, so much so that she is unable to feel any empathy towards the 
Iraqi prisoners as fellow human beings. She saw them, and continued to see them, only as the 
enemy. 
B. “The Dark Side” of Organizations: A Causal Model of Organizational Deviance 
Diane Vaughan’s research also provides important guidance on how the organizational 
structure of prisons may aid in the commission of wrongdoing by employees of the prison system. 
Specifically, Vaughan’s work regarding “organizational deviance”—defined as “an event, 
activity, or circumstance, occurring in and/or produced by a formal organization, that deviates 
from both formal design goals and normative standards or expectations, either in the fact of its 
occurrence or in its consequences, and produces a suboptimal outcome”—is instructive.56 Her 
definition of organizational deviance encompasses three different categories of deviance: 
organizational misconduct, organizational mistake, and organizational disaster.57 Within this 
model, organizational misconduct encompasses “acts of omission or commission by individuals 
or groups of individuals acting in their organization roles who violate internal organizational 
rules, external laws, or administrative regulations on behalf of organization goals.58 Under this 
                                                                
51  See id. at 6-35, 43-48, 74-92.  
52  Id. at 7. 
53  Id. 
54  Id. at 7, n. 3. 
55 Nina Mandell, Lynndie England Says Abu Ghraib Prisoners Got “Better End of the Deal”, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (March 20, 2012) (internal quotations omitted), http://nydailynews.com/news/national/lynndie-england-abu-gharib-
prisoners-better-deal-article-1.1047505#ixzz2LBv8EJGZ.  
56  Diane Vaughan, The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 
271, 273 (1999) (italics omitted) [hereinafter Vaughan, The Dark Side]. 
57  Id. 
58  Vaughan, Theorizing, supra note 25, at 9 (emphasis added) (citing Vaughan, The Dark Side, supra note 
56, at 288). 
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definition, events such as the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib may be considered episodes of 
misconduct, as the military soldiers committed violations of military rules and international laws 
against torture and the treatment of prisoners, yet believed they were supporting organizational 
goals and meeting the demands of superiors.59 For instance, in early interviews, then Private 
Lynndie England expressed the view that her actions were merely in line with military objectives 
in Iraq.60 Specifically, in response to a question about whether approval from higher-ups was 
enough to validate her actions, she stated: “Well, at the time I didn’t really think about it. Cause 
like I said, it was a job. You knew it was wrong deep down inside, but if they’re saying it’s okay, 
then, hey, well. . . .”61 
Abuses that occur in civilian prisons under circumstances similar to Abu Ghraib could 
also fit within Vaughan’s definition of misconduct. Vaughan’s causal model for organizational 
deviance offers critical insights for understanding the impact of organizational design on 
misconduct under three main elements: (1) “the environment of organizations,” which includes 
both competitive and regulatory aspects; (2) “organization characteristics,” meaning structure, 
processes, and tasks; and (3) “the cognitive practices of individuals within,” meaning how 
individuals internalize norms and use them to normalize or neutralize their acts of deviance.62 
III. “PLACE OF THE BANISHED”63: ABU GHRAIB AS CASE STUDY 
In Part III, this Article uses a specific organization, the Abu Ghraib prison, as a heuristic 
frame that employs both the sociological and organizational theories of Erving Goffman and 
Diane Vaughan to demonstrate how criminal misconduct is tied to organizational structure. 
Although Abu Ghraib is a military prison, it represents an appropriate case study for 
understanding the cause of human rights abuses in civilian prisons for two reasons. First, Abu 
Ghraib offers a strong, shared base of knowledge about prisoner abuses because of the widespread 
attention that it received in the media. Second, the similarities in the behavior of prison guards in 
American military prisons and correctional officers in American civilian prisons provide fertile 
ground for applying organizational lessons gleaned from a case study of Abu Ghraib to the larger 
U.S. carceral system. Part III applies Goffman’s theories regarding the effects of a total institution 
to the events at Abu Ghraib. Specifically, this Part applies Goffman’s theories on the destabilizing 
effect of a total institution on prison guards, particularly when the guards, as was the case in Abu 
Ghraib, are required to reside within the prison itself. Finally, Part III concludes by applying 
Vaughan’s causal mode of organizational deviance, drawing in material from other theorists to 
flesh out the model. 
In employing Abu Ghraib as a case study for understanding how the carceral system as a 
                                                                
59  The incidents at Abu Ghraib may also meet the elements of an organizational disaster, which Vaughan 
defines as a type of routine nonconformity that “is a physical, cultural, and emotional event incurring extensive social loss 
in the locale of the disaster but far beyond, becoming a part of the collective memory.” Vaughan, Theorizing, supra note 
25, at 9 (citation omitted). Because of the enduring emotional impact of the abusive acts, this Article would argue that Abu 
Ghraib has reached the scale of disaster.  
60  Phillips, supra note 5. 
61  Id. 
62  Vaughan, The Dark Side, supra note 56, at 274. 
63  Although the English translation of the place name “Abu Ghraib” is disputed due to non-agreements 
between the different dialects of Arabic, one possible translation is “place of the banished.”  See, J.M. COWAN. Arabic-
English Dictionary: The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (English and Arabic Edition). 1977. 
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total institution facilitates misconduct, Part III seeks to answer the following questions about Abu 
Ghraib: (1) What were Abu Ghraib’s specific organizational characteristics that facilitated the 
incidents? (2) How did the environments (both competitive and regulatory) at Abu Ghraib foster 
or enable the events that occurred? (3) What were the individual cognitive processes and choices 
through which the deviance was neutralized and normalized? 
A. “Out in The Suck”: The Destabilizing Effects of an Isolated Total Institution 
An emblematic characteristic of Abu Ghraib is its organization as a total institution. 
Thus, it is no surprise that the events at Abu Ghraib conform to sociologist Erving Goffman’s 
theories as to the disordering effects of isolation and life within a total institution.64 Due to the 
remote location of the Abu Ghraib prison, the American prison officers existed in a state of 
isolation and had to endure the “special hardship” of co-existing with their prisoners with no 
breaks and no social integration with the outside world.65 This, in turn, created status anxiety and 
resulted in over-identification with their role within the organization that was unmitigated by 
exposure to outside norms.66 
One explanation for the demeaning acts meted out on the prisoners is that the soldiers, 
who were outnumbered, felt that this was necessary to make the prison population 
“manageable.”67 The overcrowding in the prison, coupled with the complete social isolation of the 
soldiers,68 created a dangerous feeling of powerlessness. The prison was in the middle of a desert 
and reaching it meant traversing some of the most dangerous parts of Iraq; it was bounded on all 
sides by “hot spots” (towns with active military fighting).69 The Military Police (“MPs”), i.e., 
prison guards, felt as locked in and “forsaken” as the prisoners,70 and the boredom of not having 
contact with the outside world stoked aggressive tendencies. For example, one soldier commented 
on witnessing group brutality by MPs at Abu Ghraib after the killing of some American soldiers: 
I don’t know why a lot of people did things that night. I wish I did. Anger, 
fatigue, boredom, stress, I think, just a lot of everything combined . . . [I]t’s like 
a cabinet—you can fill it, you can shove stuff in there for so long, but it’s going 
to hit a certain point [and] you ain’t going to be able to put anything else in it. 
It’s just going to explode open.71 
In reference to riots by the prisoners, another MP stated: “I wished I could riot down at 
Camp Victory, go jump on some commander’s desk who’s eating steak and shrimp every night in 
                                                                
64  See GOFFMAN, supra note 18, at 6-35, 43-48, 74-92; see also supra Part II.A. 
65  See GOFFMAN, supra note 18, at 7, n. 3; see also supra Part II.A. 
66  See supra Part II.A. 
67  See GOFFMAN, supra note 18, at 89. 
68  Several studies have demonstrated the disordering effects of social isolation. See generally, e.g., David S. 
Davis, Good People Doing Dirty Work: A Study of Social Isolation, 7 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 233 (1984) (examining the 
causes and effects of social isolation among bailbondsmen); (Peggy Thoits, Multiple Identities and Psychological Well-
Being: A Reformulation and Test of the Social Isolation Hypothesis, 48 AM. SOC. Rev. 174 (1983) (framing social 
isolation as “the possession of few social identities” that “give meaning and guidance to behavior”).  
69  See GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 78. 
70  Id. at 79. 
71  Id. at 188. 
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air-conditioning while I’m out in the suck, humping it out with the detainees that outnumber me 
like two hundred to one.”72 But the isolation and ever-present danger created from over-crowding 
weren’t the only factors that instigated human rights abuses. The organizational design of the 
prison also had an impact. The next section employs Vaughan’s theories on organizational 
deviance to reveal the organizational flaws that led to and fostered misconduct by the prison 
guards. 
B. The Dark Side of Abu Ghraib: Applying Diane Vaughan’s Causal Model 
Going beyond merely the features specific to a total institution, Diane Vaughan’s 
theories on organizational deviance allow for the construction of a causal model of organizational 
misconduct that draws insights from the characteristics of a specific organization, the 
environment within which that organization finds itself (both competitive and regulatory), and the 
individual cognitive processes that allow for the deviance to occur and continue to occur. As this 
is a causal model, other theorists of sociology and organizational studies are also relied upon to 
further explicate the model. In this subsection, the characteristics of an organization are 
disassembled into its structure and culture. Under organizational structure, this Article finds four 
main sites of deviance within Abu Ghraib: 1) ineffectual leadership, 2) the overcrowding and 
ambiguous status of prisoners, 3) the rigidity of the chain of command, and 4) structural secrecy. 
Under organizational culture, this Article finds five main areas that enabled misconduct at Abu 
Ghraib: 1) shifting organizational standards, 2) a duty to follow orders, 3) an over-identification 
with the organization, 4) the out-grouping of prisoners, and 5) shielding and solidarity. This 
Article then examines the environment (both competitive and regulatory) within which Abu 
Ghraib found itself. Finally, this Article discusses the individual cognitive processes that 
motivated, allowed, and facilitated the deviant acts at Abu Ghraib. 
1. Constructing a “Bad Barrel”: Organizational Structure at Abu Ghraib 
This section analyzes how the design of Abu Ghraib’s organizational structure fostered 
deviance. The four main characteristics of Abu Ghraib’s structure that lent themselves to deviance 
are: 1) ineffectual leadership, 2) the overcrowding and ambiguous status of the prisoners, 3) the 
rigidity of the chain of command and the primacy accorded to hierarchy, and 4) the structural 
secrecy that was created by the above listed factors. 
a. Ineffectual Leadership 
General Karpinski, the commander in charge of the prison had never run a prison before 
and had no training to do so.73 As a result of her lack of training and experience, she also lacked 
the appropriate perceptual filters to understand the seriousness of the initial reports of deviance 
and react appropriately to them.74 In The Executive Effect, William Starbuck and Frances Milliken 
discuss the idea of “perceptual filters” and “perceptual accuracy,” particularly as these concepts 
pertain to decision-makers.75 Their most notable concept is that the source of information tends to 
                                                                
72  Id. at 189. 
73  See GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 32; Hersh, supra note 5. 
74  See id. 
75  See generally William H. Starbuck & Frances J. Milliken, Executives’ Perceptual Filters: What They 
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determine how the information is perceived.76 Information flows more easily—that is, it is 
perceived as more credible and of greater import—from the top down.77 Executives tend to 
disregard information from subordinates while subordinates tend to reify, even against their own 
practical experience, information they receive from their higher-ups.78 
This is a highly troubling phenomenon for organizational decision-making because 
subordinates are much more likely than executives to be immersed in the functioning of the 
organization and, thus, are also more likely to have direct, first-hand knowledge of the 
organization’s shortcomings. Subordinates are also in a better position to determine effective and 
practical solutions to those problems. Abu Ghraib was no exception to this organizational trend as 
initial reports of deviance from lower-ranking soldiers that managed to filter back to commanding 
officers were ignored or not properly addressed.79 
b. Overcrowding and the Ambiguous Status of the Prisoners 
The ambiguous status of the prisoners also provided opportunities for deviance. Due to 
overcrowding, much of the proper prison protocol for identifying and cataloguing prisoners in 
accordance to the seriousness of their accused crimes, or of their alleged ties to terrorism, was 
disregarded.80 In fact, due to the indiscriminate nature of the arrest sweeps carried out by the 
American military in Iraq, many of the prisoners also included common criminals and unfortunate 
passersby or bystanders that had been caught in the dragnet.81 Many of the soldiers who served as 
MPs did not know the prisoners by their real names and did not know of what exactly they were 
accused.82 The nicknames given to the prisoners kept them “unreal” and further served to rob 
them of individuality and humanity.83 Some of the prisoners were intentionally kept anonymous 
and referred to as “ghost prisoners.”84 The officer in charge of interrogation, Captain Wood, 
admitted to the pressures created by overcrowding and the lack of discrimination in detaining 
Iraqis: “Pressures were increasing from overpopulation, the mission creep from bonafide security 
detainees to others who probably really didn’t need to be detained for a long period, and the 
realization that Iraq was evolving into a long-standing mission.”85 
                                                                
Notice and How They Make Sense, in THE EXECUTIVE EFFECT: CONCEPTS AND METHODS FOR STUDYING TOP MANAGERS 
40-58 (Donald Hambrick ed., 1988). 
76  Id. at 42 
77  See id.  
78  See id. I refer to this reification of orders from above as the “primacy of hierarchy.” See infra Part 
III.B.a.3. This effect is also seen from soldiers’ accounts of the neutralization or normalization of deviance. See infra Part 
III.B.d.2. 
79  See e.g., GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, 157, 164-65, 170-71; see also MARK DANNER, 
TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004) 10-25. 
80  See GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 22–24, 42–44. 
81  Id.; see also DANNER, supra note 78, at 2-3. 
82  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 23, 42-43, 95, 99. 
83  Id. at 99–101. 
84  Id. at 95. 
85  Id. at 38-39. 
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c. The Rigidity of the Chain of Command and the Primacy Accorded to Hierarchy 
Another aspect of the organizational structure that enabled deviance was the adherence 
to a chain of command86 and the primacy given to hierarchy, two related and very important 
structural features of the military. First-hand accounts from the MPs reveal that they felt they 
were dependent on the chain of command and allowed it to dictate their behavior.87 They also 
trusted the hierarchy; thus, any feelings of unease they might have felt were assuaged by verbal 
reassurances by their superiors.88 In regards to some of her actions at Abu Ghraib, one MP 
asserted: “At the time, everyone in our chain of command said that was OK. The questions were 
asked and answered. So after that, what do you do?”89 
The impression at Abu Ghraib was that Military Intelligence (“MI”) was “running the 
show” and dictating what actions were to be carried out on the prisoners.90 As one MP stated: “If 
MI didn’t exist at Abu Ghraib, . . . the detainees would have been in their cells, and we would 
have been in the office watching a movie or drinking coffee.”91 Another soldier, who was not an 
MI, was explicitly reminded of the hierarchical division of labor when he attempted to follow the 
chain of command and report an incident of abuse to his superior.92 The soldier recalls: “I said, 
‘Sir, Military Intelligence over at the hard site—they are doing some pretty weird things with 
naked detainees.’ He told me I had no business being over there, and he also told me, ‘Stay out of 
MI’s way and let them do their job.’”93 
d. Structural Secrecy 
At Abu Ghraib, social isolation, coupled with the rigid hierarchy and chain of command, 
created “structural secrecy.”94 Structural secrecy exists where an organization’s structure—the 
hierarchy, division of labor, geographic dispersion, specialized units—provides opportunities for 
individuals to violate on the organizations behalf “by 1) creating many locations where 
misconduct could occur and 2) creat[ing] invisibility, [by] blocking oversight by insiders and 
outsiders alike.”95 MI, as a highly specialized unit, had a shadowy and dispersed presence in Abu 
Ghraib and their position, as higher-up in the chain of command, lent a cloak of legitimacy to 
their actions and shielded their deviant acts from criticism. 
2. Good People Doing Dirty Work: Organizational Culture at Abu Ghraib 
The culture and norms within an organization also play significant roles in both 
                                                                
86  Following a chain of command is a structural feature of the military that is also related to following 
orders; this second concept will be discussed under the organizational culture and norms infra Part III.B.b.2. 
87  See, e.g., GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, 157, 164-65; see also Phillips, supra note 5. 
88  Id. 
89  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 165. 
90  Id. at 157. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  See Vaughan, Theorizing, supra note 25, at 17; see also supra Part II. 
95  Id. 
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providing incentives for deviance and perpetuating deviance. Sociologically, “culture” is defined 
as the ways of thinking, the ways of acting, and the material objects that together shape a people’s 
(i.e. group’s or organization’s) way of life.96 Thus, an organizational culture is the model through 
which the organization makes sense of its competitive and regulatory environments and constructs 
the “intendedly rational” means to the achievement of its goals.97 As Charles Perrow finds, 
“humans are only ‘intendedly rational.’ They attempt to be rational but their limited capacities 
and those of the organization prevent anything near complete rationality.”98 Barry Turner and 
Nick Pidgeon’s work on disaster provides further valuable insights.99 Of note is the idea that 
“[d]isasters always represent failures of intention.”100 Following this line of thought, Turner and 
Pidgeon suggest that the occurrence of a disaster indicates that there has been a failure of the 
“rational mode of thought and action” which is being relied upon “to control the world.”101 
A contemporary illustration of such a “failure of intention” would be the trend towards 
mass incarceration. Although the ostensible intention behind mass incarceration policies was to to 
reduce crime, a closer look reveals that mass incarceration deprives individuals of access to 
education and that those individuals depart prison with the disqualifying mark of incarceration, a 
combination of factors which limit or altogether stymie their employment prospects leaving them 
with no other recourse but to resort to crime to earn an income.102 Therefore, an analysis of 
organizational deviance must also seek to understand the “native” culture of the organization, or 
in other words, the universe of information within which an organization is deriving its goals and 
norms.103 
In the organizational analysis of the failed NASA rocket launch, The Challenger Launch 
Decision, Vaughan shifts from a “bad apple” model of deviance, wherein the deviance is blamed 
on the individual’s inherent characteristics, to a “bad barrel” approach, wherein structural 
incentives for deviance are uncovered.104 That study revealed that “[n]orms—cultural beliefs and 
conventions originating in the environment—create unreflective, routine, taken-for-granted scripts 
that become part of individual worldview. Invisible and unacknowledged rules for behavior, they 
penetrate the organization as categories of structure, thought, and action that shape choice in some 
directions rather than others.”105 The question for this study is: What were the norms at Abu 
                                                                
96  JOHN J. MACIONIS & LINDA M. GERBER, SOCIOLOGY 60 (7th ed. 2010). 
97  See generally CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY 121 (1986).  
98  Id. 
99  See generally BARRY A. TURNER & NICK F. PIDGEON, MAN-MADE DISASTERS (1997). 
100  Id. at 4. 
101  Id. at 4-5.  
102  Id. 
103  See generally VAUGHAN, CHALLENGER, supra note 44, at 77-79, 114 (introducing the concept of a 
“native view” through which people in a particular organization interpret their experiences, and arguing that “individual 
behavior cannot be understood without taking into account the organizational and environmental context of that 
behavior”). 
104  See generally id. at 196-237 (arguing that work group culture led to organizational deviance and, 
ultimately, the failed Challenger launch decision); see also Vaughan, Theorizing, supra note 25, at 17 (“[C]ompetition and 
scarce resources systematically generate pressure on all organizations to engage in deviance to achieve organizational 
goals.”). 
105  VAUGHAN, CHALLENGER, supra note 44, at 37; see also PERROW, supra note 96, at 121 (suggesting that 
members of an organization “are provided with the information needed to make correct organizational decisions” and 
“adapt their decisions to the organization’s objectives”). 
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Ghraib that fostered or enabled deviance? I identify five important cultural elements of Abu 
Ghraib that are implicated in the deviant events: 1) shifting organization standards, 2) duty to 
follow orders, 3) identification with the organization, 4) out-grouping of prisoners, and 5) 
shielding and solidarity. 
a. Shifting Organizational Standards 
The lack and non-specificity of organizational standards contributed to “practical 
drift”106—a “slow steady uncoupling of practice from written procedure”107— that resulted in 
extreme deviance. After the events of September 11, 2001, then Vice-President Dick Cheney 
expressed to reporters that the “war on terror would not only be fought on the battlefield, but also 
by working ‘the dark side.’”108 When pressed as to whether the U.S. government would lift 
restrictions on methods of intelligence gathering, his response was: “Oh, I think so.”109 The work 
of lifting those restrictions started in January 2002 when the president declared that “the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to any prisoners taken in the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.”110 Rather than prisoners of war, those individuals would instead be classified as 
“unlawful combatants.”111 
When this pronouncement was contested, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales 
drafted a memo exploring arguments for denying POW status to an “enemy force as a whole.”112 
Of his many arguments, he found that such a denial of POW status allowed for “flexibility in . . . a 
new kind of war that renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy 
prisoners, and renders quaint some of its provisions.”113 Further, from a perceived loophole in the 
Geneva Convention, the administration derived a new classification for the prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib: “security detainee.”114 Article Five of the Fourth Convention, which normally “extends 
Geneva’s regime of rights and protections to civilians in wartime,” provides an exception for 
individuals “detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity 
hostile to the security of the Occupying Power.”115 Thus, when General Karpinski first came to 
Abu Ghraib, she was corrected on her use of the word “prisoner” and was told that “security 
detainee” was the right word.116 She later explained that “calling someone a security detainee was 
                                                                
106  See generally SCOTT A. SNOOK, FRIENDLY FIRE: THE ACCIDENTAL SHOOTDOWN OF U.S. BLACKHAWKS 
OVER NORTHERN IRAQ 24, 79-201 (2000) (defining “practical drift”). 
107  See SNOOK, supra note 106, at 194. 
108  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 28-29. 
109  Id. at 29. 
110  Id. at 30. 
111  Id. 
112  Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to President George W. Bush, Decision 
Re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 
2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf; see also GOUREVITCH & 
MORRIS, supra note 20, at 30. 
113  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 30 (internal quotations omitted). 
114  See id. at 32-33. 
115  Id. at 33; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 
5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-
0173.pdf [hereinafter Geneva Convention].  
116  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 32.  
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far more than just word-smithing. . . . It was meant as a convenience to sidestep the law, to 
sidestep the requirements of the Geneva Conventions.”117 It is important to note, however, that the 
same article of the Geneva Convention goes on to state: “In each case, such persons shall 
nevertheless be treated with humanity . . . .”118 
The Bybee Memo, written by legal counsel John Yoo and signed by then Assistant 
Attorney General Jay Bybee, went further in terms of establishing the lack of restrictions 
regarding treatment of prisoners.119 The memo sought to answer the question of how far 
interrogation of prisoners could go without violating the U.N. Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and advised that “only the most 
extreme acts” would qualify as torture.120 The memo also referenced international law decisions 
such as Ireland v. United Kingdom,121 which found that “hooding prisoners, subjecting them to 
loud noise, and depriving them of sleep, food, and drink pending or during interrogation” did not 
amount to torture.122 Further, “the Bybee memo stressed: neither the Convention Against Torture 
nor U.S. law against extraterritorial torture imposed criminal penalties for cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading acts.”123 
The first rules of operation for interrogation at Abu Ghraib were more permissive than 
those in place at the Guantanamo Bay Prison and, within one month, five different versions of the 
rules had circulated.124 In addition, there was no opportunity to provide training and, even if there 
had been time, no trained personnel were made available to provide it.125 As they were, the rules 
did not provide specific guidance as to the permitted interrogation methods.126 Some felt that this 
lack of specificity of rules was intentional; Colonel Warren stated: “I believe that MI doctrine 
suggests that use of approved approaches should be left to the imagination of the interrogator.”127 
An MP further noted: “They couldn’t say that we broke the rules because there were no rules. . . . 
Our mission was to help MI, and nobody ever said, ‘this is your SOP [standard operating 
procedure].’”128 
This lack of specificity fostered a “practical drift,”129 and created a situation in which 
soldiers reached into the dark recesses of their imagination to invent the most degrading and 
inhumane treatments for prisoners. As Scott Snook theorized, “practical drift” is the phenomenon 
                                                                
117  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
118  Geneva Convention, supra note 115. 
119 See generally Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, 
White House Counsel, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available 
at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.08.01.pdf [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum]. 
120  Id. 
121  Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1976). 
122  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 48-49; see also id.; Bybee Memorandum, supra note 119. 
123  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 49 (internal quotations omitted); see also Bybee 
Memorandum, supra note 119. 
124  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 51–53. 
125  Id. at 54. 
126  Id. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 92. 
129  See generally SNOOK, supra note 106, at 24, 79-201. 
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of deviance wherein local efficiency becomes paramount over globally accepted behavior.130 In 
the case of Abu Ghraib, the MPs had too much room to search for “local efficiencies” for 
interrogation since the soldiers were not restricted by clear boundaries.131 
b. Duty to Follow Orders 
It is ironic that in addition to a lack of rules for soldiers, the duty to follow orders—
traditionally the one clear organizational norm that has always existed for soldiers—became a 
vehicle for the perpetuation of deviance. One soldier recalled feeling uneasy about an incident 
when the prisoners were put in a naked dog-pile, but he also reported feeling that he could not do 
anything about it: “Yes, you know a difference between right and wrong, but you are also taught 
to follow orders when they’re handed down, and [a superior officer] told me that they were doing 
what they were told. So, I figured, OK. That’s why you do it. You follow orders in the military. 
That’s all you can do.”132 
c. Identification with the Organization 
For soldiers, the implacable commitment to follow orders was also a form of identifying 
with an organization.133 This type of identification is particularly salient for organizational 
settings such as the armed forces where individuals spend a significant amount of their life 
involved in organizational activities, including professional and/or occupational activities. 
Howard Becker and James Carper have found that there are “four major elements of work 
identification: (1) occupational title, and associated ideology; (2) commitment to task; (3) 
commitment to particular organizations or institutional positions; and (4) significance for one’s 
position in the larger society.”134 The experiences of Charles Graner, an MP who had come with 
civilian training as a prison guard, illustrate how identification can change drastically with 
environment. He stated: “I had come in with a correctional officer’s mind-set of care, custody and 
control, and I’m going to do the least amount of work possible and get paid for it because that’s 
what corrections officers do.”135 He later admitted that this mindset “lasted for about a day.”136 
Although at first Graner questioned some of the techniques that MI asked him to employ to break 
prisoners, he soon became very active in “fear up harsh” approaches that led up to an 
interrogation, including spraying prisoners in the eyes with pepper and meting out other horrific 
                                                                
130  See generally id. 
131  Id. at 194 (“Constant demands for local efficiency dictate the path of the drift. Over time, incremental 
actions in accordance with the drift meet no resistance, are implicitly reinforced, and hence become institutionally 
accepted within each subunit.”) 
132  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 195. 
133  Prior studies have found that individuals identify themselves in terms of the names and categories of the 
groups in which they participate. See, e.g., Nelson N. Foote, Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation, 16 AM. 
SOC. REV. 14, 17-18 (1951). For an extended treatise on an extreme case of a soldier identifying with a military 
organization , See generally, HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1963). 
134  Howard S. Becker & James W. Carper, The Elements of Identification with an Occupation, 21 AM. SOC. 
REV. 341, 341 (1956). 
135  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 121. 
136  Id. 
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physical abuse.137 Graner even went so far as to brag about having the power to “make a grown 
man piss himself.”138 
d. Out-grouping of Prisoners 
The out-grouping of prisoners as outsiders facilitated the occurrence of the abuses at Abu 
Ghraib. There were several outbursts of rage reported after the killings of American soldiers by 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs).139 Such outbursts resulted in the prisoners being subjected 
to physical abuse, and the soldiers were usually not reprimanded in these instances.140 Rather, the 
violent outbursts were viewed as an understandable outpouring of rage and despair;141 it was 
normalized for the soldiers to vent their frustrations on prisoners, an acceptable “out-group.”142 
Everett Hughes notes that out-grouping requires a dissociation of a group of people from the norm 
and a recreation of that group as inherently deviant.143 He points to the prison population as a 
commonly perceived out-group in any country.144 This type of out-grouping can also be seen in 
transcripts from Abu Ghraib, for instance, when a sympathetic soldier refers to one of the Iraqi 
victims of brutality as “it.”145 An important concept is that out-grouping does not require explicit 
agreement or overt acts; rather an individual’s participation in out-grouping can be tacit.146 As 
Hughes notes, the “good people” who do “dirty work” may be viewed as agents of society who 
have been charged with handling out-groups: a dirty job that others wish to have done but do not 
want to do.147 He argues that there is some complicity of society at large, even if it is merely in 
passively constructing those victims as out-groups.148 
e. Shielding and Solidarity 
Another explanation that Hughes gives for a reluctance to act is the notion that silence 
serves to preserve the solidarity of the group.149 Silence also shields against any experience of 
collective guilt.150 One soldier, upon seeing the photographs and realizing that it amounted to 
                                                                
137  Id. at 121–27, 165–66, 221. This same type of work identification was seen in the Stanford Prison 
Experiment. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 35, at xii, 196-97, 207. 
138  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 127.  
139  See GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 188–91. 
140  See id. at 188-91, 220-21. 
141  Id. 
142  See Everett C. Hughes, Good People and Dirty Work, 10 SOC. PROBS. 3, 7 (1962). 
143  Id. at 7-9. 
144  Id. at 7. 
145  See, e.g., Hersh, supra note 5. 
146  Hughes, supra note 142, at 4, 9-11. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. An interesting concept that Hughes brings up is that many of the S.S. officers in the Nazi regime 
belonged to a class of people that could be perceived as Gescheiterte Existenzen, i.e., societal failures. Id. at 9. Thus, for 
them, the Nazi party presented an opportunity where they could be actively involved in “out-grouping” and thus, by 
extension, also in “in-grouping” themselves. Id. 
149  Id. at 6. 
150  Id. 
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sexual abuse, expressed his hesitation to report it: “I’d been in the military and around a lot of 
these guys long enough to know we take care of our own . . . . That I [would be] turning in my 
friends, that I [would be] a traitor, that I [would be] a stool pigeon.”151 Another soldier, who chose 
to leave a scene after witnessing sexual abuse of prisoners, recalled: “I was told, ‘Hey, you didn’t 
see shit.’ And me being the person that I am—I try to be friends with everybody—I said, ‘See 
what? I didn’t see nothing.’”152 The higher-ups were also complicit in the shielding that occurred 
at Abu Ghraib. For example, after one soldier reported some of the abuse, Colonel Pappas 
instituted an “Amnesty Period,” instructing soldiers to get rid of “contraband” and providing 
written notice that soldiers were prohibited from possessing photos of detainees, pursuant to the 
Geneva conventions.153 The soldiers perceived this as a tacit instruction to get rid of evidence.154 
By keeping silent about the misbehavior of her subordinates, the commanding officer at 
Abu Ghraib perhaps felt she was maintaining the cohesiveness of the group of prison guards. 
Perhaps she felt disciplinary action would have forced them to turn against each other and thus 
would have created a chaotic situation at the prison. Jack Katz takes up this concept of “tacit” 
collusion and also of “shielding.”155 Katz finds that superiors have an interest in shielding their 
subordinates from external perception of deviance because they depend on their subordinates for 
internal support.156 The commanding officer, who, as a woman, perhaps already felt her authority 
to be precarious, might have feared that taking any kind of disciplinary action against the first 
incidents at Abu Ghraib would have served to undermine her authority and her ability to 
successfully command performance from her subordinates. 
Studies have also shown that, with military groups for example, concerted protection of a 
deviant member builds solidarity within the group and joint participation in deviance serves to 
create an internal social bond.157 The creation of an internal cohesiveness within an organization 
can, however, be problematic for regulation. Katz quotes the sociologist George Simmel as noting 
that “internal conflict strengthens external authority,” whereas collective integrity may serve to 
preserve the secrecy of wrongdoing.158 In an organization where there is internal cohesiveness or 
even an internally developed code of conduct, the dictates of the internal moral authority will 
prevail when tensions develop between internal moral authority and external moral authority.159 
Thus, internal organizational solidarity, while it has positive effects, also has the negative effect 
of causing organizational members to cover up acts that the larger society would perceive as 
deviant.160 This theory has been borne out in various scandals involving organizations where 
internal solidarity is perceived as a key requirement for proper functioning, such as the military, 
the police, and also the higher echelons of the government.161 Conversely, the deviant acts of an 
                                                                
151  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 233. 
152  Id. at 197–98. 
153  Id. at 247-48. 
154  Id. at 249 
155  See generally Jack Katz, Cover-Up and Collective Integrity: On the Natural Antagonisms of Authority 
Internal and External to Organizations, 25 SOC. PROBLEMS 3 (1979) (“[T]rac[ing] the roots of organizational cover-up to 
the sources of collective authority.”) 
156  Id. at 5–6. 
157  Id. at 5. 
158  Id. at 4. 
159  Id. 
160  Id. at 4-6 
161  Police corruption scandals in many cities in America, as well as accusations of corruption in Congress, 
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organization are exposed to regulation when there is a rift in cohesiveness;162 it is the disgruntled 
worker who takes on the role of whistleblower and who calls in outside regulation. 
3. Constant Pressure and a Toothless Regulator: The Role of the Environment 
Following Vaughan’s causal model, this Article analyzes how the environment within 
which Abu Ghraib found itself incentivized deviant acts and limited opportunities to curtail those 
acts. In this section, the Article details both 1) the competitive environment that surrounded Abu 
Ghraib, specifically, the pressure to obtain military intelligence; and 2) the regulatory 
environment that proved too lax to forestall misconduct. 
a. Competitive Environment: Constant Pressure Leads to Desperate Acts 
As Vaughan notes, a competitive environment is an essential part of a causal model of 
organizational deviance because “what [is] true for individuals [is] also true for 
organizations. Regardless of position in the organizational stratification system, competition and 
scarce resources systematically generate pressure . . . to engage in deviance to achieve 
organizational goals.”163 A well-established organizational principle is that organizational actors 
are usually “intendedly rational,” meaning that they generally act in furtherance of the goals of the 
organization.164 Thus, an analysis of organizational deviance must start with organizational goals 
and how their pursuit might lead to deviance. In the organizational analysis of Abu Ghraib, we 
find that the scarce resource for which there was deviance-inducing competition was military 
intelligence. 
The military prison at Abu Ghraib was born out of the “War on Terror,” an undeclared 
and shadowy war, which, in turn, was a direct response to the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001.165 The horrific events of that day—which immediately claimed almost three 
thousand lives and then hundreds more as first responders died from illnesses and injuries related 
to their heroic rescue efforts—represented the first large scale foreign terrorist attack on American 
soil.166 Both what was perceived as an urgent need to acquire military intelligence (to forestall 
future terrorist attacks) and a fervent quest to find “weapons of mass destruction” (WMDs) 
spurred the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 by a multinational military campaign led by the 
United States.167 
The paramount justifications given for the invasion were that then-Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein was providing support to known terrorists (although there was no explicit 
connection established between him and Al-Qaeda) and that military intelligence suggested the 
                                                                
are examples of this in practice. 
162  See Katz, supra note 155, at 4-6. 
163  Vaughan, Theorizing, supra note 25, at 17. 
164  See PERROW, supra note 96, at 121; see also supra Part II.B.b. 
165  See GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 26-34, 39. 
166  See, e.g., 9 Years Later, Nearly 900 9/11 Responders Have Died, Survivors Fight for Compensation, 
FOXNEWS.COM, Sept. 11, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/09/09/report-responders-died-ground-zero-
illnesses/. 
167  See White House Spells Out Case Against Iraq, CNN.COM, September 12, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2002/US/09/12/iraq.report/. 
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Iraqi government had amassed or was attempting to create WMDs.168 When proof to support 
either of these claims failed to quickly materialize after the advent of the war, the U.S. 
government found itself under great public pressure to justify its military presence in Iraq and 
provide credible reasons for the invasion.169 The government was also under scrutiny to provide 
proof of the success of the War on Terror.170 These public pressures were then passed on to the 
military personnel present in Iraq and, specifically, to the soldiers in the military prisons that 
housed alleged terrorists with potentially useful information.171 
b. The Regulatory Environment: Toothless Regulators and Lack of Oversight 
The regulatory environment is an important element that determines deviance because an 
organization that faces stringent regulatory oversight will be discouraged from deviance, whereas 
lax regulations might encourage it. For Abu Ghraib, there existed three entities which could exert 
some regulatory power over its operations: 1) U.S. military; 2) U.S. government; and 3) 
international law and community. While the U.S. military ostensibly had great regulatory power 
over Abu Ghraib, in practice their regulation proved to be very lax due to a conflict of interest. 
Specifically, if the U.S. military acknowledged the deviance at Abu Ghraib, it would also be 
forced to expose the military’s shortcomings to the world and open itself up to scrutiny and 
embarrassment. This is why the military’s initial response to reports of deviance was containment 
or concealment, as evidenced by the “Amnesty Period”—during which soldiers burned 
photographs172—and the commissioning of the Taguba report—which explicitly excluded the role 
of MI from its investigation and which many perceived as a delay tactic since the scope was so 
broad it took several months to complete.173 
The U.S. government was also a lax regulator because it had an interdependent 
relationship with the Abu Ghraib prison; it needed the military intelligence that might be 
procured. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik have observed that deviance can stem from the 
interdependence of organizations.174 In essence, deviant acts within an organization that manage 
to reach the attention of an outside regulatory body are not addressed and continue to be 
unregulated if the organization and regulatory body are interdependent. 
The international community, as represented by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), also proved to be a lax regulator. Although it is true that the ICRC was initially 
denied full access to inspect Abu Ghraib by military police, the ICRC was “toothless” and could 
not command any real reform even after it was given full oversight and directly witnessed 
                                                                
168  Id. 
169  See id.; see also Seymour M. Hersh, Selective Intelligence, NEW YORKER, May 12, 2003, at 44 
(questioning the reasons for the war in Iraq given that WMDs had not been found). 
170  Id. 
171  See DANNER, supra note 78, at 3 (describing how American soldiers at Abu Ghraib became “desperate 
for ‘actionable intelligence’” as the War on Terror “heated up”); White, supra note 6 (“A lack of planning and resources . . 
. led to the U.S. detention system getting overwhelmed and fostered frustration with a lack of actionable intelligence with 
which to fight the insurgency.”) (emphasis added). 
172  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 247-48; see also supra Part II.B.b.5. 
173  Id. at 250–51. 
174  See generally JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF 
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 40-43 (2003) (discussing the effects of interdependence on 
organizational outcomes). 
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brutalities there.175 The ICRC’s powerlessness stemmed from its “closed-circuit system of 
monitoring and accountability,” which kept reports secret and allowed for the sharing of concerns 
only with the offending party.176 
4. Individual Cognitive Processes 
As noted by Vaughan, individual cognitive processes also contribute to organizational 
misconduct.177 The individual observes the organizational structure, culture, and competitive and 
regulatory environment; and judges whether it is permissive or facilitative, or would even reward 
his intended conduct.178 The individual then psychologically prepares herself to commit the act 
and handle the repercussions of the act through cognitive processes.179 Two main cognitive 
processes are seen at play at Abu Ghraib: (1) perception of the risk attached to committing the 
deviant act, and (2) a “neutralization” and “normalization” of the deviant act. 
a. Perception of Risk 
The individual choices that resulted in the incidents at Abu Ghraib revolve around an 
important element of deviance: the construction of risk. For example, in her study of the 
Challenger disaster, Vaughan finds that a culture of risk pervaded the NASA space program and 
led to the individual choices made by leaders there.180 In her “native view” of the organization,181 
she found NASA engineers had become accustomed to an environment of “residual risk” where 
decisions had to be made, even with uncertainty, and “work groups were calculating risk under 
circumstances that made risk fundamentally incalculable.”182 In essence, she finds that the 
concept of “acceptable risk” had become normalized in NASA culture.183 To drive home this 
point, Vaughan examines NASA’s adoption of an “acceptable risk” framework regarding a 
crucial component of the space shuttle, the O-ring seal, even after it showed negative deviations 
in performance.184 
The idea of an organizational culture in which a certain amount of “residual risk” is 
deemed part of the job is congruent with the analysis of Abu Ghraib as a total institution. It is 
undeniable that the job of a prison guard entails high risk. The guard is always outnumbered and 
must constantly be on guard against physical assault. This is a “residual” and continuous risk that 
any guard accepts when she takes the job. In the case of Abu Ghraib, the questions that remain 
are: 1) How was this risk “normalized”? 2) Could the deviant actions of the guards be viewed as a 
way of “neutralizing” some perception of this risk? 
Sociologist Charles Lindblom notes that no decision is made in a vacuum, but is made in 
                                                                
175  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 88, 170. 
176  Id. at 170. 
177  Vaughan, The Dark Side, supra note 56, at 274, 289-91. 
178  Id. at 290-91. 
179  Id. 
180  See generally VAUGHAN, CHALLENGER, supra note 44, at 77-118  
181  See id. at 77-79. 
182  Id. at 79. 
183  See id. at 110. 
184  Id. 
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comparison to other decisions that preceded it.185 Further, there are few decisions made with any 
real belief that it will be the panacea that the organization requires for all its ills.186 Rather, as 
Lindblom rightfully notes, most executives are “muddling through,” making incremental changes, 
with each new change being influenced or derived from the one that preceded it.187 However, in 
addition to causing “narrowing”—wherein a decision leads down one path and eliminates other 
possible paths188—such an approach also presents a problem with “practical drift,” wherein local 
efficiency becomes paramount over globally accepted behavior.189 To illustrate, as a result of 
practical drift, workers might develop ways of getting the job done that deviate from established 
protocols and procedures, particularly when such standard operating procedures are treated as 
boilerplate. Paul Schulman addresses another problematic aspect of this type of decision-making 
when he talks about “decisional tunneling.”190 This is the idea that because decisions are 
influenced by past decisions, one bad decision can spiral into disutilities and culminate in a 
disastrous one.191 He uses the Watergate incident as a particularly good illustration to drive home 
this point.192 
Applying these theories to Abu Ghraib, the commanding officer at Abu Ghraib might 
have perceived the risks of keeping silent to be insignificant; after all, in her mind, she had 
nothing to do with the abuse. Meanwhile, the risks of publicizing the incidents may have been 
monumental; they included embarrassment of the organization, aspersions cast on her leadership 
abilities, and perhaps even the loss of her job. The institution of an “Amnesty Period” at Abu 
Ghraib also shows “decisional tunneling;” rather than address the deviance immediately, the 
military’s first response was that of containment. 
b. Neutralization and Normalization 
Sociologist Mark Granovetter introduced the “principle of neutralization” as a method to 
understand how exchanges are constructed as non-corrupt.193 He demonstrates how 
“neutralization” happens as a way to normalize an exchange such that it is no longer deviant but 
morally acceptable within the cultural and social framework in which it took place.194 Further, 
neutralization can happen in the context of distributive practices wherein, for example, employees 
are paid “lower wages” but are allowed perks or fringe benefits are offered in exchange for 
                                                                
185  See generally Charles Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959); 
see also VAUGHAN, CHALLENGER, supra note 44, at 114 (“[I]ndividual behavior cannot be understood without taking into 
account the organizational and environmental context of that behavior.”). 
186  See Lindblom, supra note 185, at 86. 
187  Id. at 86-88. 
188  Id.  
189  See SNOOK, supra note 106, at 24, 79-201; see also supra Part II.B.b.1 pp. 25-26. 
190  See generally Paul R. Schulman, The Logic of Organizational Irrationality, 21, 32 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 31, 
31 (1989) (Examining the “process of decisional ‘tunneling’ in which members of a set of decisions progressively 
undermine the rationality of one another, degrading organizational means-ends calculations”). 
191  Id. at 32. 
192  Id. at 33, 36. 
193  See generally Mark Granovetter, The Social Construction of Corruption, in ON CAPITALISM 152, 154 
(Victor Nee & Richard Swedberg eds., 2007). 
194  Id. at 154-56. 
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worker “contributions” that go beyond the pale of what is required by duty.195 These concepts are 
of interest in analyzing the events at Abu Ghraib and instances of corruption at any high risk, low-
paying, and often isolated job.196 
As has been detailed above, the commanding officers were aware of some of the abuses 
occurring at Abu Ghraib long before this information was leaked to the press. One conclusion is 
that higher ups were willing to look the other way and “neutralize” the incidents of abuse as 
letting off steam, or as normal and unavoidable results given the stressful and isolated nature of 
the job. The low risk of being discovered, given the isolation of Abu Ghraib, combined with the 
concept of prisoners as an “outgroup,” impacted the individual choices made by deviant members 
of the organization and how the deviance was initially handled by leaders in the organization. 
IV. PREVENTING HISTORY FROM REPEATING ITSELF: RECOMMENDATIONS  
FOR REFORM 
The question then remains: What can be done to ensure that the type of human rights 
abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib do not continue to occur within the larger American carceral 
system? As Vaughan notes in the Columbia report, while some superficial changes (such as 
firings and demotions) were effected after the Challenger launch failure, none of the changes 
addressed NASA’s organizational characteristics, such as its structure and competitive 
environment.197 These same characteristics, coupled with a history of normalization of deviance, 
were what resulted in a second launch failure years later.198 With only cosmetic changes and no 
real organizational reform, history repeated itself. 
There is a palpable danger of history repeating itself in the case of Abu Ghraib, 
particularly given the wrist-slaps and the selection of “bad apples” following Abu Ghraib. For 
one, the commander of the prison who claimed ignorance of the events received only a demotion 
and suffered no criminal or civil liability for the events.199 Further, the evidence shows that there 
are strong organizational explanations for the deviance that occurred at Abu Ghraib. Both the 
competitive environment of Abu Ghraib as an organization and the regulatory environment (or the 
lack thereof) within which it was situated provided key incentives for the perpetration and 
perpetuation of human rights abuses. Although public outcry did lead to some results—several 
soldiers were court-martialed following the incidents and the prison has been closed as an 
American military prison—to date, there still has been little effort toward systemic reform or full-
scale organizational corrective measures..200 As a decade passes since the events at Abu Ghraib, it 
                                                                
195  Id. at 155-56. 
196  This description would apply to all prison wardens and/or officers, and would also apply to other risky 
(and perceived as low-paying) professions such as police officers—where corruption and brutality are understandable 
temptations given the exposure to violence, counterfeit drugs, and money gained from illicit activities—and for 
firefighters—where the wait-times inherent to the job would facilitate time-theft. 
197  Vaughan, History, supra note 44, at 101, 196-99. 
198  Id. 
199  GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra note 20, at 263; see also generally James W. Smith III, A Few Good 
Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the Failure of the Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 671 
(2005) (analyzing methods through which the military justice system can address the failures at Abu Ghraib to hold 
commanders accountable for disciplinary breaches). 
200  See, e.g., Victor Hansen, What’s Good for the Goose is Good for the Gander Lessons from Abu Ghraib: 
Time for the United States to Adopt a Standard of Command Responsibility Towards its Own, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 338-
41 (2006) (offering a wide-ranging discussion of all military disciplinary action taken regarding the events at Abu Ghraib, 
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remains important to note that there has been no attempt to fix the organizational problems within 
the American military prison system that could result in another Abu Ghraib or an attempt to 
address the organizational problems that contribute to the enactment of Abu Ghraib-like incidents 
of human rights abuses within the American domestic carceral system as a whole. 
This organizational analysis of Abu Ghraib is policy-oriented. A study of Abu Ghraib 
informs future governmental policy regarding the running of current military prisons and the 
organizational lessons to be gleaned from studying how and why the events at Abu Ghraib 
occurred also holds implications for the rising privatization of civilian prisons and their 
regulation. In 2000, 264 privately operated facilities were under contract with state or federal 
authorities to hold prisoners, an increase of 140% from 1995.201 The number of inmates held in 
these facilities rose 459%, from 16,663 inmates in 1995 to 93,077 in 2000.202 This trend towards 
private prison systems is projected to continue given that privatization is erroneously perceived as 
a budget-cutting measure by many states.203 
Further, an organizational analysis of Abu Ghraib holds implications for future strategies 
to be employed in the continued War on Terror. The War on Terror has been fraught with 
controversies and has introduced new ethical and foreign policy quandaries for the American 
government and its allies.204 The little-discussed fact is that some of the intelligence-gathering 
techniques applied in Abu Ghraib were first implemented in Afghanistan, the first target of the 
War on Terror.205 More than ten years later, the War on Terror has yet to end. Osama Bin Laden’s 
demise at the hands of American Navy Seals has not put an end to the war or the ethical 
quicksand in which it has mired the United States. Rather, Bin Laden’s death has served to stoke 
ongoing debates regarding the use of torture by the U.S. government for intelligence gathering 
purposes.206 While torture proponents quickly lauded “waterboarding” techniques for helping 
track the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden,207 others just as quickly countered that the 
                                                                
illustrating the shortcomings of those superficial disciplinary actions, and detailing the serious and adverse consequences 
of the U.S.’ failure to have a legal mechanism affixing criminal responsibility on commanders). 
201  JAMES J. STEPHAN & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2000 iv (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/csfcf00.pdf. 
202  Id. at v. 
203  See, e.g., Richard A. Opel Jr., Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 
2011, at A1. 
204  Five days after the 9/11 attacks, then Vice-President Dick Cheney expressed to reporters that the “war 
on terror would not only be fought on the battlefield, but also by working ‘the dark side.’” GOUREVITCH & MORRIS, supra 
note 20, at 28-29. 
205  See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 21, 2001), available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ [hereinafter Bush Address]. The Taliban government of 
Afghanistan became the first target of the War on Terror after then Commander in Chief, George W. Bush, demanded that 
they hand over Osama Bin Laden and other operatives of the terrorist Al-Qaeda group believed to be responsible for the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Id. 
206  See generally Scott Shane & Charlie Savage, Harsh Methods of Questioning Debated Again, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 4, 2011, at A1 (discussing and questioning the argument that “enhanced measures” of interrogation led to the 
intelligence that resulted in Bin Laden’s capture). 
207  Waterboarding is one form of “enhanced interrogation techniques” advocated in the so-called torture 
memos written by legal government advisor John Woo and signed by the then head of the legal counsel of the Department 
of Justice, Jay Bybee. See John Barry et al., A Tortured Debate, NEWSWEEK, June 21, 2004, at 50; see also generally 
Bybee Memorandum, supra note 119. Waterboarding occurs when the person under interrogation is immobilized and 
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information had been obtained without harsh treatment and that Abu Zubaydah, a detainee who 
had been “waterboarded” 83 times in August 2002, had revealed no new information.208 
Informed by an organizational analysis of the events of Abu Ghraib, this Article suggests 
several key organizational leverage points within which real and lasting reform may be achieved 
for the American carceral system as a whole. These are: A) the rethinking and re-articulation of 
the goals of incarceration, B) the adequate and continued psychological assessment and training 
of correctional officers, and C) greater oversight of prisons and jails by independent commissions 
both at the state and federal level. 
A. Rethinking and Rearticulating Carceral Goals 
To avoid future abuses like those at Abu Ghraib, the American carceral system must 
make key changes to its organizational structure, notably its aims for incarceration. Specifically, it 
must move from carceral goals related to pure retribution to include rehabilitation as a paramount 
objective. Sharon Dolovich is a legal scholar who has written extensively on prison law.209 In one 
of her seminal works, she argues that the prison within American society has become a “catch-all” 
for all of society’s ills and, worse, it serves to produce the very conduct which society abhors.210  
She has also argued that once the State takes on the role of punishment, the State then owes an 
affirmative duty to protect it prisoners from abuse, she terms this obligation, the state’s “carceral 
burden.”211 
Dolovich argues: 
The state’s carceral burden is the price society pays for the decision to 
incarcerate convicted offenders. This arrangement may be thought of as 
society’s carceral bargain. It allows society to remove certain individuals from 
the shared public space, but only on the condition that the state assumes an 
ongoing affirmative obligation to meet the basic human needs of the people 
exiled in this way. The prohibition on cruel punishment means that the terms of 
the bargain are nonnegotiable. If society prefers, it can choose not to 
incarcerate. But if it wants the benefits of incarceration, society must bear the 
burden. . .212 
There is no arguing that in the public’s collective imagination, and effectively in 
practice, prison has become less a place of rehabilitation and more a vehicle for retribution.213 
                                                                
water is poured over a cloth or other covering placed over the face, creating a sensation of drowning. 
208  See Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2009, at A1. 
209  See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 
438–40 (2004) (discussing overcrowding in prisons); and, Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 
DUKE L.J. 439 (2005) (discussing ethical issues stemming from the use of private prisons). 
210  Sharon Dolovich, Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 240-41 ( 2009). 
211  Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 881, 891, (2009). 
212  Id. at 892 
213  See generally, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF PRISON (1977) 
(analyzing the social and theoretical mechanisms behind the massive changes that occurred in the carceral systems of 
western nations during the modern era); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
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With limited educational opportunities available in prison and a lack of vocational programs or 
meaningful work, prison has become a “warehouse”214 for society’s unwanted, rather than a place 
where offenders may redeem themselves. With a dismal national recidivism rate, wherein 67.5% 
of released prisoners are expected to recidivate within three years,215 and with growing impunity 
surrounding human rights abuse meted out to prisoners,216 it is time for a re-thinking and a public 
re-articulation by the government of the aims of incarceration in order to ensure that American 
society is meeting its carceral burden. 
The Nixon administration saw the declaration of the “War on Drugs”217 and President 
George W. Bush echoed the same martial sentiment when he announced his “War on Terror,”218 a 
war that has proven to be an indiscriminate dragnet that captures many innocents, including 
American citizens.219 Current recidivism rates make clear that a “lock ‘em up” attitude has done 
little to reduce crime or accomplish the ultimate goal of the penal system: protecting society. 
Rather, the many reports of human rights abuses indicate that the system’s overly punitive 
approach has led to widespread and callous disregard for the human dignity of prisoners. The 
present situation denotes a need for a rearticulation of carceral goals that privileges rehabilitation 
above retribution. According precedence to rehabilitation would result in a change in attitude as to 
how prisoners may be treated and would reaffirm a commitment to the human rights of all 
individuals, including prisoners. 
                                                                
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001) (examining recent changes in the criminal justice systems of America and Great Britain 
and arguing that these systems have been molded primarily by two social forces: modern social organization and 
neoconservative politics); ROBERT PERKINSON, TEXAS TOUGH: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S PRISON EMPIRE (2010) 
(presenting a history of the American carceral system from the ages of slavery to the present and analyzing how the Texan 
penal system has become one of the largest and most influential in the U.S.); Lockdown (National Geographic television 
broadcast 2007) (presenting an educational examination of prisons and jails in the U.S.). 
214  MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 
18 (2010) (“The stigma of criminality functions in much the same way that the stigma of race once did. It justifies a legal, 
social, and economic boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ . . . [M]ass incarceration is designed to warehouse a population 
deemed disposable . . . .”). 
215  See PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 1 (2002) (approximating a national recidivism rate by tracking 272,111 
prisoners released from prisons in fifteen states; this population represents two-thirds of all prisoners released in the U.S. 
for that year).  
216  See supra Part I pp. 2-3. 
217  See, e.g., Richard Nixon, Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control (July 17, 1971), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3047#axzz1O4tlYr7a; Richard 
Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Control of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (July 14, 1969), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2126#axzz2fxQ3II12. 
218  Bush Address, supra note 205. 
219  See, Peter Finn, “U.S. citizen sues over treatment in ‘rendition’”, THE WASHINGTON POST (November 
11, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/10/AR2009111012772.html (detailing the 
capture and “rendition” of an American citizen to foreign countries where he was tortured); see also, National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub.L. 112–81. This NDAA contains several controversial sections (see article), 
the chief being §§ 1021-1022, which affirm provisions authorizing the indefinite military detention of civilians, including 
U.S. citizens, contained in the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub.L. 107–40. See also, “New Bill 
Authorizes Rendition of American Citizens Living within the United States to Other Countries for Torture” 
WASHINGTON’S BLOG (DECEMBER 21, 2011), http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2011/12/new-bill-authorizes-rendition-of-
american-citizens-living-within-the-united-states-to-other-countries-for-torture.html.  
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B. Adequate and Continued Training and Psychological Assessment of Officers 
Organizational lessons from Abu Ghraib teach us that the American carceral system 
must better prepare itself, and specifically its workers, to deal with the effects that a total 
institution such as prisons can have on their psyches and thus actions.220 As Goffman’s work 
highlights, officers and guards within prisons must be prepared to deal with the mental effects of 
isolation and constant danger. The government holds the affirmative duty to adequately train and 
prepare correctional officers for the rigors of working in a prison. 
A prison guard’s preparation will vary from state to state – sometimes even from county 
to county – however, the training typically consists of a few weeks of training coupled with an 
apprenticeship, termed “on the job” training.221 Whether overseas or domestic, there should be 
standardized and uniform training of correctional officers in all American prisons. This would 
prevent the tendency towards “practical drift,” wherein a lack of clear standards leads officers to 
make up operating procedures that accomplish what they perceive as the goals of their job, even 
where those new procedures might go against societal norms.222 The training of correctional 
officers should also take into account the effects of a total institution;223 officers should be 
prepared to deal with the mental effects of isolation and constant danger. In addition to “report 
up” protocols, wherein the prison officer would report any witnessed abuse to superiors, there 
should also be “report out” mechanisms in place to support whistleblowers and enable the outflow 
of information from within the organization. 
Additionally, although there may be some mention that candidates should be of sound 
mind, and an eye and physical exam is often administered, there is usually no specific 
requirement for a psychological examination.224 A standardized and generalized psychological 
evaluation—perhaps akin to tests currently required of aspiring police cadets225—should be 
mandated for all correctional officers, regardless of whether the officer will work in a public, 
private, or military prison. These tests should be administered periodically for the duration of an 
officer’s tenure. While the preliminary psychological tests will ensure that officers with sadistic or 
violent tendencies will be excluded from consideration for employment, continued testing will 
help identity officers who either begin to develop those tendencies or begin to over-identify with 
their authoritative role and experience a diminished sense of empathy. 
                                                                
220  See supra Part I.A. 
221  See generally, e.g., STATE OF CAL., BD. OF CORR.’S, ADULT CORRECTIONS OFFICER CORE TRAINING 
COURSE MANUAL (2000); STATE OF FLA., DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, TRADITIONAL CORRECTIONAL BASIC RECRUIT 
TRAINING PROGRAM (2011). 
222  See supra Part III.B.b.1. 
223  See supra Part I.A. 
224  See generally, e.g., Correctional Officer: California State Personnel Board Specification, CAL. DEP’T 
OF HUMAN RES.’S, http://www.calhr.ca.gov/state-hr-professionals/pages/9662.aspx (last visited February 25, 2013) (listing 
the qualifications and desirable qualities of applicants for correctional officer positions).  
225  In some jurisdictions, potential police cadets are subject to psychological tests, although this may be at 
the discretion of the police department. See, e.g., CADET SELECTION PROCEDURES, PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=4451&&PageID=474394&mode=2 (last visited 
November 11, 2013). But see MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS, LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, http:// 
agency.governmentjobs.com/lvmpd/default.cfm?action=viewclassspec&ClassSpecID=35076 (last visited November 11, 
2013) (requiring only a physical test and no psychological test for potential recruits). 
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C. Greater Independent Oversight of Prisons 
American prisons operate with only minimal external supervision and are essentially 
allowed to self-police. The U.S. Bureau of Prisons is responsible for monitoring federal prisons226 
and state prisons are typically supervised by the Department of Corrections of the particular state. 
Additionally, the American Correctional Association, composed of prison directors from across 
the nation, also conducts audits and accredits prisons.227 Such incestuous professional dynamics 
and self-monitoring can foster incentives and opportunities for misconduct and deviance.228 The 
fact that structural secrecy played a major role in enabling and perpetuating the abuse at Abu 
Ghraib signifies the need for an outside regulatory agency to monitor all American prisons. Only 
this type of external supervision can ensure transparency and guarantee prisons are operating in 
accordance with international human rights regulations. 
Such an outside regulatory agency could take the form of a congressional-type 
committee with investigatory oversight. For civilian prisons, given the increased privatization of 
the carceral system229 and the trend towards what some caution is an “American Prison Industrial 
Complex,”230 the agency must be able to implement regulations that private prisons are required 
to follow. Further, to ensure that competitive business interests do not lead to amoral calculations 
and deviant acts as part of a normalized business procedure, the necessary regulations must be 
proposed and administered by independent boards that have no financial stake within the system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States prides itself on being an arbiter of human rights law.231 As evidence of 
the nation’s deep respect for the sanctity of human life and liberty as well as its practical 
understanding that preserving human rights fosters international security, American soldiers have 
been deployed for humanitarian interventions, spanning from World War II to the Bosnian war 
and, more recently, the Arab Spring.232 Thus, it is inconsistent that American law should allow 
                                                                
226  See generally About the Bureau of Prisons, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.bop.gov/about/index.jsp (last visited October 2, 2013). 
227  See generally Standards & Accreditation, AMERICAN CORR.’AL ASS’N, https://www.aca.org/standards/ 
(last visited September 18, 2013). 
228  See Katz, supra note 155; see also supra Part II.B.b.5. 
229  From 2000–2011, the percentage of inmates held in private facilities rose from 6.3% to 8.2%. See 
ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2000 7 
(2001); E. ANNE CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 
2011 32 (2012). 
230  See, e.g., Angela Davis, Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial Complex, COLORLINES 
(Sept. 10, 1998), http://www.colorlines.com/archives/1998/09/masked_racism_reflections_on_the_prison_industrial 
_complex.html; Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1998, at 51. 
231  See generally, e.g., President Jimmy Carter, Inaugural Address (January 20, 1977), available at 
http://www.famous-speeches-and-speech-topics.info/presidential-speeches/jimmy-carter-speech-inaugural-address.html; 
President Jimmy Carter, Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame (May 22, 1977), available 
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7552; President Barack Obama, Speech to the United Nations 
General Assembly (September 25, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/world/obamas-speech-to-the-
united-nations-general-assembly-text.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
232  See generally, e.g., Robert A. Pape, When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian 
Intervention, 37 INT’L SEC. 41 (2012) (examining the justifications for U.S. humanitarian intervention). 
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human rights abuses to continue within its own carceral system. This Article provides a radical 
analysis of the cause of abuses within the American prison system; that is, it uncovers the root of 
the problem and reveals it to be organizational. Targeted laws that address the organizational 
sources for deviance within the American carceral complex will allow for better prevention of the 
sort of abuses seen at Abu Ghraib and within domestic prisons. 
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